This paper analyzes mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a previously neglected channel of industrial restructuring in the face of trade liberalization. Using the CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 as a source of exogenous variation in trade barriers, I show that trade liberalization leads to a signi…cant increase in M&A activity. I also provide evidence that resources are transferred from less to more productive …rms in the process and that the magnitude of the overall transfer is quantitatively important. Taken together, these results suggest that M&As are an important alternative to the previously studied adjustment channels of …rm and establishment closure and contraction. This has strong implications for the design of competition policy in the wake of trade liberalizations since M&As may o¤er a more e¢ cient way of transferring resources than contraction and closure of low productivity …rms combined with internal growth of more e¢ cient …rms.
Introduction
Recent economic research on the e¤ects of trade liberalization has highlighted the importance of studying the …rm-and establishment-level adjustment processes triggered by freer trade (a short and inexhaustive list of contributions includes Tybout et al., 1991; Tybout and Westbrook, 1995; Pavcnik, 2002; and Tre ‡er, 2004) . A central insight from these studies is that a substantial part of the impact of freer trade works through a reallocation of resources across individual plants and …rms. In particular, the contraction and exit of low productivity establishments and the expansion of more productive ones can explain a sizeable share of aggregate productivity increases found in the wake of trade liberalizations (see Pavcnik, 2002; and Tre ‡er, 2004) .
While this literature has thus demonstrated the general importance of micro-level resource reallocation in understanding the e¤ects of freer trade, the central issue of how resources are transferred between individual …rms is still not su¢ ciently well understood. In particular, only scarce attention has been paid to resource transfers through the market for corporate control, i.e. through mergers and acquisitions (M&As). This is despite the fact that M&As can, in principle, play a similar role as the adjustment processes highlighted in the existing literature. Instead of closing down establishments, reducing output or exiting altogether, …rms also have the option to search for buyers interested in parts or the whole of their operations. Similarly, expanding …rms can buy and integrate other …rms rather than expand production at existing plants or open new ones.
Establishment-level studies which focus on plant-level contraction, exit or expansion implicitly ignore this potential margin of adjustment since they do not look at changes in ownership at continuing plants. 1 The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically whether M&As do indeed play a role in industrial restructuring in the face of trade liberalization. This is important for a number of reasons. First, studying M&As is necessary to obtain a more complete picture of the mechanisms …rms use to adjust to freer trade and the extent of inter-…rm resource transfers involved in this adjustment. Second, M&As are not just another way of transferring resources but are likely to be qualitatively di¤erent from the other adjustment forms in that they are swifter and potentially more e¢ cient. Instead of workers and capital becoming unemployed for some period before being rehired, acquisitions allow for an immediate transfer into new ownership. Also, M&As allow the takeover of entire production structures which may be most e¢ cient if preserved as a whole. Finally, knowing whether or not M&As play an important role in …rm adjustment to freer trade might also shed new light on results from previous plant-level studies. For example, reallocations of control rights at existing establishments and ensuing restructuring undertaken by the new management might be part of the reason for the important within-plant increases in productivity found in many studies (e.g. Tybout and Westbrook, 1995; Pavcnik, 2002 ).
The particular liberalization episode I will study in this paper is the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of 1989. As will be argued in more detail, CUSFTA provides an ideal setting for the purpose of this study. Most importantly, it represented a clear-cut and unanticipated policy experiment which was not introduced in response to macroeconomic shocks nor accompanied by other major economic reforms. Furthermore, the main policy instrument used (tari¤ cuts) is easily quanti…able and shows a large variation across sectors. Finally, the large size di¤erence between the treaty partners and the implied variation in expected responses to the integration shock further increases the potential for convincing econometric identi…cation.
Against this background, I will present three main sets of …ndings. In a …rst step, I examine whether there is evidence that CUSFTA led to more M&A activity. Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach, I …nd a substantial increase in the number of domestic Canadian transactions which is positively correlated with the magnitude of tari¤ cuts across sectors. The impact on domestic U.S.
M&A activity is much smaller and mostly statistically insigni…cant, consistent with the idea that CUSFTA presented a bigger shock for the smaller Canadian market. Cross-border transactions show substantial changes around the implementation of CUSFTA as well, although the link to tari¤ cuts is less clear cut.
In a second step, I examine …rm-level characteristics of targets and acquirers in order to investigate whether acquisitions involve a transfer of resources from less to more productive …rms, as seems to be the case for the previously studied channels of adjustment (exit and contraction). This is indeed what I …nd: acquirers tend to be bigger, more pro…table and more productive.
In a …nal step, I look at the amount of inter-…rm transfers of output and employment in North America that were due to M&As during my sample period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . Comparing results to resource transfers via exit and contraction, I …nd that M&As were quantitatively important relative to these alternative channels of adjustment. Taken together, these results suggest that M&As are The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses empirical predictions on the link between trade liberalization and M&A activity based on insights from existing theoretical work. Section 3 provides additional background information on CUSFTA and section 4 describes the data. Section 5 proceeds to the empirical investigation of changes in M&A activity in the wake of CUSFTA, section 6 compares characteristics of targets and acquirers and section 7 provides evidence on the quantitative importance of M&As as a form of resource transfer. I conclude with a summary of …ndings and some potential implications for economic policy (section 8).
Theoretical Predictions
How might trade liberalization lead to an increase in M&A activity? In order to highlight a potential mechanism, the following discussion combines insights from closed-economy models of M&A activity Rousseau, 2002, 2004) with results from recent heterogenous …rm models in International Trade (e.g. Melitz, 2003) . 3 The underlying assumption of models of M&A activity, such as the one by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) , is that all …rms possess assets that are of interest to other …rms. These can be speci…c production skills, marketing capabilities or simply physical capital needed for production.
Changes in demand and supply conditions will lead to changes in …rm-speci…c demand for these assets, with expanding …rms wanting to increase their stocks and contracting …rms looking for potential buyers. While the necessary transfer of resources can take place via both M&As and internal investment or divestment, it is straightforward to derive empirically relevant conditions 2 An earlier study by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and a recent working paper by Greenaway et al. (2005) present (mixed) evidence on the link between import penetration rates and M&As. However, since there is no exogenous variation in this measure of exposure to trade, it is not obvious whether their results can be interpreted in favor or against a link between trade liberalization and M&A activity. For example, any negative productivity shock that triggers restructuring of a given industry is likely to involve M&As (see Andrade et al., 2001) . At the same time, the decline in the sector's relative productivity as compared to the rest of the world will lead to more imports and a higher import penetration rate. Such issues are reminiscent of the problems which plagued earlier studies on the link between trade and mark-ups, …rm size or productivity (as discussed in Tybout, 2001 , or Fernandes, 2003 . 3 The focus here is on the basic intuition and empirical predictions. A formal derivation of some of the main results from a fully speci…ed model is contained in an earlier working paper version of this paper (available at www.essex.ac.uk/economics). under which both channels are active in equilibrium. 4 Within this framework, the demand shock resulting from bilateral trade liberalizations such as CUSFTA is easily analyzed. The crucial e¤ect of such liberalizations is their di¤erential impact across domestic …rms with di¤erent levels of productivity (see Melitz, 2003) . As a number of studies have shown, setting up export activities is costly and requires an initial investment (see Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 2004) . Thus, only more productive …rms that can a¤ord these setup costs will bene…t from liberalization through increased exporting opportunities.
Low productivity …rms, in contrast, will su¤er lower pro…ts due to more intense product market competition from foreign …rms while at the same time being unable to bene…t from better access to the foreign market. Both e¤ects will be stronger the bigger the extent of liberalization, i.e. the bigger the decrease in variable trade costs such as tari¤s. Thus, while exporters need additional capital in order to expand operations, non-exporters attach less value to their existing capital stock.
As before, M&As provide a mechanism through which the necessary transfers of assets can take place. Given that only the most productive …rms will be exporters, a direct implication is that assets are transferred from less to more productive (and pro…table) …rms.
Note that the above is in essence a story about domestic within-sector adjustment to trade liberalization. While a within-sector analysis will be part of the empirical analysis below, the data reveal a number of features which require additional considerations. The …rst concerns the substantial size di¤erences between the liberalization partners, with the U.S. market being about ten times the size of its Canadian counterpart. This suggests that trade liberalization should have a much stronger e¤ect on M&A activity in Canada since increases in both import competition and exporting opportunities will be substantially bigger there.
Second, a large share of M&A activity consists of diversifying or conglomerate M&A transactions that go across industry boundaries. The basic intuition outlined above still applies, however.
Firms want to acquire production capacity in other industries through acquisitions both because of improved exporting opportunities there or because increased import competition has made assets cheaper. Since the target's capital is likely to be sector speci…c in the vast majority of cases, this argument also makes clear that the relevant reductions in variable trade costs in such a multi-sector model are the ones facing the acquisition target. This is because the acquirer will have to use the new production capacity to produce the target industry's goods.
Finally, acquisitions also take place across national borders. For example, expanding foreign exporters may want to acquire import competing domestic …rms in addition to non-exporters in their own home market. A growing body of theoretical research suggests that additional considerations come into play for this category (see Bertrand and Zitouna, 2006; Bjornvatn, 2004) As before, the decrease in the domestic …rms' asset reservation price will encourage acquisitions. However, there will now also be a counterbalancing e¤ect for horizontal M&As arising from tari¤-jumping considerations: decreases in variable trade costs make it easier to serve the foreign market via exports and reduce the incentives to establish production capacity there via acquisitions. The overall e¤ect of trade liberalization on M&A activity is thus not clear cut.
To summarize, the above discussion suggests addressing the following questions in the empirical analysis: In terms of economic analysis, CUSFTA presents several advantages over other trade liberalizations. First, the main instrument of liberalization -tari¤ cuts -is easily quanti…able and shows a large variation across sectors which allows for the implementation of a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation strategy. Secondly, CUSFTA was a clearly de…ned policy experiment in the sense that it was neither part of a larger packet of market reforms nor was it introduced in response to a macro- In the context of studying the impact of trade liberalization on M&A activity, CUSFTA has two additional advantages. First, its rati…cation by the Canadian parliament was highly uncertain as late as November 1988. 5 The fact that its eventual implementation was thus far from being a foregone conclusion reduces concerns about anticipatory M&A activity and makes the years before 1989 a suitable control period. In addition, CUSFTA was a liberalization agreement between industrialized countries with developed …nancial markets and few restrictions on mergers and acquisitions, at least in comparison to most other developing and developed countries. Indeed, although there exists, to my knowledge, no econometric evidence to date, there is some anecdotal evidence that CUSFTA has led to an increase in M&A activity (OECD, 2001 ). Given that a number of 5 See Brander (1991) and Morck et al. (1998) for a chronology of the events leading up to the eventual rati…cation of CUSFTA. During the entire process, rati…cation was considered uncertain given both the prior history of failed attempts to negotiate free trade with the U.S. and the strength of the opposition to CUSFTA in Canada. This opposition involved strong factions within the oppositional Liberal Democrats, the New Democratic Party as well as various organizations and trade unions. Indeed, the Liberal Democrats'leader, John Turner, publicly vowed as late as October 1988 that he would dismantle CUSFTA in case of victory in national elections scheduled for 21 November 1988. Opinion polls during the month leading up to the elections suggested that a victory for his Liberal Party was a distinct possibility (for example, Gallup indicated a 10% lead as late as November 7). However, the Canadian Conservative Party party managed to reverse public opinion in the …nal weeks before the election and the government was returned with a parliamentary majority su¢ cient to ratify CUSFTA. all corporate transactions involving at least 5% ownership of a company and a transaction value of one million U.S. dollars or more or where the value of the transaction is undisclosed. In line with the 6 The data are the same as those described in Head and Ries (1999) . I would like to thank Keith Head for making them available to me. Appendix A.1 provides some additional details on their construction. 7 Compare footnote 2 and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) for a more general discussion of the pitfalls of various other indirect measures. Of course, tari¤ rates are at the discretion of policy makers and as such subject to di¤erent endogeneity problems. However, as argued in the previous section, such concerns have less weight in the case of CUSFTA where tari¤ cuts were unexpected and largely exogenous (at least once one controls for the variation in initial tari¤ levels -as I will do by using industry …xed e¤ect, see below). discussion in the previous sections, I use all M&A deals involving acquisitions of U.S. or Canadian manufacturing targets by other U.S. or Canadian …rms, yielding approximately 26,000 transactions in the main period under study (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) . I de…ne "M&As"broadly to include sales of individual business segments and divisions as well as of entire companies. This is consistent with the idea from the discussion in section 2 that M&As can both be a form of contraction and total …rm exit.
For most of the analysis, I exclude acquisitions of minority interests from my sample and focus on transactions that raise the acquirer's share above 50%. 8 Transactions are classi…ed into three-digit industries and matched with the tari¤ data according to the primary activity of the target company or the acquired business segment (see Appendix A.1 for details). For the main part of this paper, I
will use the number of mergers and acquisitions in a given period as my principal indicator for M&A activity. Using numbers rather then aggregate deal volumes has two principal advantages. First, it is the much more readily available indicator since for the majority of deals, transaction values are not published (this is the case for 55% of deals in my dataset). Second, value measures are extremely sensitive to the treatment of very large deals which often make up signi…cant proportions of the total deal volume despite representing only a few out of several thousand transactions every year. 9 However, since count data might overestimate the importance of smaller transactions, section 5. and +65% for Canada. 10 More subtly, there also seems to be a connection between M&A activity and initial tari¤ rates (columns 7-8): industries with higher import tari¤s in 1988 also experience less takeovers during the entire period 1985-1998 (the correlation coe¢ cient is -32% for the U.S.
and -48% for Canada). This seems in part to be a direct consequence of the relation between M&A activity and the number of establishments: highly protected industries are usually industries in decline which already have experienced shakeouts and have relatively few remaining players.
The next question is who the buyers of U.S. and Canadian manufacturing …rms are. Table 2 provides some information on this by listing the principal …eld of activity of acquiring …rms. As the …gures show, slightly more than 60% of acquirers are also manufacturing …rms, both in the U.S. and in Canada. Moreover, about a third of all transactions occur within the same three-digit sector and another 11% within the same two-digit sector, so that within-industry resource tranfers via M&As seem to be an important phenomenon. Around 17% of acquirers of U.S.-…rms (22% for Canada) have their principal …eld of activity outside manufacturing (SIC-codes 2-3) although this …gure probably overestimates the incidence of diversifying or conglomerate M&As. This is since about one quarter of non-manufacturing acquirers actually possess secondary …elds of activity in manufacturing, with the …gure being as high as 58% in some categories (see columns 3 and 7). 11 The second to last line of table 2 lists a category of acquirers that deserves special attention.
The group "Investors, n.e.c."(SIC 6799) represents an amalgamation of di¤erent types of acquirers that are not easily classi…able elsewhere. The main subgroups of SIC 6799 are private equity and venture capital …rms, investor groups, and individual investors. In all cases, it seems likely that acquisitions by these groups represent a signi…cant reallocation of resources in the sense that targets will be exposed to substantial changes in management practices, restructuring etc. Also, among 1 0 The sources for the number of establishments are the U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada. I use the number of establishments rather than the number of …rms since my de…nition of M&As includes both acquisition of entire …rms and of individual subdivisions and possibly plants. 1 1 Looking at secondary …elds of activity also increases the numbers of transactions that are potentially of withinindustry nature. Columns 4 and 8 show the fraction of acquirers that have at least one manufacturing 3-digit SIC code that matches the primary or any secondary manufacturing SIC code of the target. If one counts all these transactions as intra-industry, the share of this reallocation type rises to 35% (38% for Canada) which represents only a modest increase of about 4%-points. Since this is clearly an upper bound, classi…cation according to primary …elds of activity seems to be a good approximation in determining the within-or between-industry nature of M&As. Note that the use of Compustat implies that the sample or comparing target and acquirer characteristics consists mainly of publicly traded …rms (although around 5% of …rms are privately held due to the additional use of data from Thomson Financial). This is in contrast to the full sample of transaction parties used for analyzing changes in M&A activity (section 5) which also includes private companies and subsidiaries. However, I believe that this does not pose major problems for the analysis. First, publicly traded …rms make up a substantial fraction of the full sample (about 35%, with private companies and …rm subsidiaries making up the remaining 65% in the Thomson M&A database). Second, as I will show in the next section, the impact of CUSFTA on publicly traded …rms was if anything slightly stronger than for the full sample of …rms. Third, although the number of publicly traded …rms is small relative to the overall number of companies in Canada and the U.S., their overall share of output and employment is above 80%. 12 Thus, even if target-acquirer di¤erences for non-publicly traded …rms were very di¤erent, the …ndings presented in section 6 would still have strong economic relevance.
My indicators of …rm performance taken from Compustat and Thomson will be measures of pre-tax income, stock market returns and total factor productivity. I will also look at net sales to give an impression of the size di¤erences between targets and acquirers. These measures are available for between 9,000 to 14,500 out of the 52,000 company-year combinations in my data (some companies are involved in several transactions in the sample period). 13 Quantitative Importance of M&As:
For the comparison of the amount of …rm-level resource transfers through M&As, contraction and exit (section 7), I will again rely on information To provide stronger evidence that the observed changes in M&A activity are indeed due to the tari¤ cuts implemented through CUSFTA, I thus split transactions within each of the four categories into two groups (…gure 2). Those from the 50% of target industries that faced the steepest tari¤ cuts and those from the remaining 50%. I choose tari¤s levied by the target's country for this classi…cation. In practice, U.S. and Canadian tari¤ reductions are very highly correlated so that results are similar when using the other tari¤ measure. From these …gures, a slightly di¤erent picture emerges. For the two domestic categories, the index of M&A activity is very similar across the two groups in the pre-CUSFTA period. From 1989 onwards, however, M&A activity in Canada increases by substantially more in the most a¤ected group. For the U.S., there is also a slightly more pronounced increase for this group although the di¤erence to the least a¤ected group is much smaller than in Canada. It thus seems that the impression from the initial graphs holds up to this di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis. M&A activity in Canada rose sharply after 1989 and the magnitude of this increase seems to be related to the extent of tari¤ cuts across sectors. The impact on the U.S. is much smaller, consistent with the notion that the liberalization shock was substantially bigger in Canada which integrated with a market ten times her own size.
Turning to the cross-border categories (the two right hand side panels), the picture is less clear.
The lines for both most and least a¤ected industries move relatively closely together over the whole period. One potential explanation for this is that tari¤-jumping motives as an additional determinant for horizontal cross-border M&A transactions are at work here. That is, in industries with stronger tari¤ reductions, U.S. (Canadian) …rms were less dependent on acquiring local production capacity to serve the Canadian (U.S.) market. Instead, they could serve the foreign market directly through exports. This additional factor might have helped to o¤set the increased incentives for acquisitions working through decreases in the domestic …rms'asset reservation prices (compare the discussion in section 2 on this point).
Econometric Speci…cation and Baseline Results
This section evaluates whether the impressions from the graphs of the last section carry over to a formal econometric analysis. Among other things, the results obtained so far have drawn attention to two potential pitfalls such an analysis faces. First, M&A activity shows strong inter-industry variation and is negatively related to initial tari¤ levels (see section 4). Since all tari¤s were eventually eliminated under CUSFTA, higher initial levels also meant stronger subsequent cuts, implying a potentially spurious correlation of tari¤ changes and M&A activity. Second, the strong increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions over the whole period 1985-1998 suggests the presence of a general economy-wide trend in M&A activity. Since all tari¤s came down after 1989 this could again lead to a spurious correlation with tari¤ cuts. To address these issues, I
will implement a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach by controlling for both industry and time …xed e¤ects.
As discussed, my indicator for M&A activity will be the number of transactions in a given time period and industry (denoted M A henceforth). The prevalence of small integer values and zeros suggests the use of count data models for the estimation. In order to smooth the data and reduce the number of zero observations, I aggregate numbers over the pre-and post CUSFTAperiod (1985-1988 and 1989-1998 ). This yields a panel with two time periods and 140 industries. targets. 14 Thus, my initial count data speci…cation is given by: The identifying assumption I will initially make (but later relax) is that all other determinants 1 4 Robustness checks using foreign tari¤ reductions as regressors yielded similar results which is unsurprising given the very high correlation of tari¤ cuts (in excess of 80%). An interesting area for future work would be to study more asymmetric liberalization agreements with su¢ cient independent variation in tari¤ cuts. Such agreements would allow to separately identify the e¤ects of import-and export-promoting policies on M&A activity. 1 5 Alternativley, one could use the (absolute) level of tari¤ cuts in the pre-and post-CUSFTA period in speci…cation (1). However, this approach yielded a number of problems for the subsequent analysis. First, the binary tari¤ cut measure introduced in the next subsection shows little variation pre-and post-CUSFTA. Second, using per-period tari¤ cuts is problematic when looking at several post-CUSFTA periods (as parts of section 5.3 do). This is because once rati…cation was certain, the time structure of the impact of tari¤ cuts is less clear (i.e. do future, present or past tari¤ cuts matter for M&A activity?). Finally, my dataset does only contain extrapolated U.S. tari¤s for 1985 and 1986. In any case, as shown for example in Gu et al. (2003) and as is also evident in my Canadian tari¤ data, tari¤ changes in 1985-1988 were very small both in absolute terms and compared to the subsequent cuts. Thus, assuming a zero-change -as is implicitly done in speci…cation (1) -seems to be a good approximation. Also see Appendix A.1 for a brief discussion of the very similar results obtained by using the Canadian tari¤ data pre and post CUSFTA. show coe¢ cient estimates of and d post for each of the four subgroups of M&As (domestic and cross-border transactions). 16 As seen, the strongest impact of CUSFTA seems to be on domestic Canadian M&A activity which is consistent with the earlier graphical analysis. The coe¢ cient estimates indicate that every percentage point decrease in tari¤s increased the number of takeovers of …rms in the a¤ected industries by on average 11.1%. Given that the mean decline in Canadian tari¤s at the three-digit level was about 7%, this suggests that CUSFTA increased M&A activity by approximately 78%. The corresponding coe¢ cient for the U.S. is actually slightly negative but far from statistically signi…cant (the t-statistic is only 0.60). This again highlights the di¤erential impact of CUSFTA on the two markets. For the two cross-border categories, coe¢ cient estimates are insigni…cant as well which again con…rms the impressions from the earlier graphic analysis.
Robustness Checks
Control Variables As a …rst robustness check, I introduce EU M&A activity in the same period as an additional regressor. This helps controlling for any time-and industry-varying determinants besides tari¤ cuts which would not have been picked up by the …xed e¤ects in my …rst speci…cation. 1 6 dpre is the excluded category so that dpost gives the average relative increase of M&A activity in comparison to the pre-CUSFTA period that is not explained by tari¤ cuts. Note that contrary to what is sometimes asserted in the literature, there is no incidental parameter problem with the …xed e¤ects Poisson regressions (see Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for a proof). That is, conditional maximum likelihood estimation (using total industry transactions M Ai = P t M Ait as the su¢ cient statistic) yields identical results to simple QML Poisson estimation with a set of industry dummies.
More speci…cally, I use the number of domestic M&As in the UK, France and (West) Germany as the control for the two regressions on domestic M&A activity and the number of all cross-border M&As with targets in one of these three countries as the control for the cross-border categories (excluding acquisitions by U.S. or Canadian …rms). 17 The idea behind this approach is that these countries were largely una¤ected by CUSFTA and changes in takeover activity there should thus pick up any general industry-level trends in underlying M&A determinants. Since many factors which might potentially in ‡uence takeover rates are highly correlated across developed countries, these trends are likely to be similar in Europe and in North America. Examples include oil price shocks, low sales growth and low capacity utilization combined with large amounts of free cash ‡ow in declining industries, or strongly increasing price-earnings ratios in times of stock market bubbles. Indeed, the simple correlation between the number of European and U.S. or Canadian M&A transactions per-period and industry is on average about 70%. 18 Columns 4-6 of table 3 show the results for my initial speci…cation with the controls in place.
As seen, the coe¢ cient estimates are very similar to the earlier results, consistent with the idea that industry and time …xed e¤ects already captured most of the in ‡uence of non-tari¤ related determinants of M&A activity.
Di¤erent Functional Forms I next examine the e¤ect of using di¤erent functional forms for my tari¤ reduction variable. The …rst alternative measure uses the log of the absolute tari¤ change, i.e. d post log(tari¤ 1988 tari¤ 1998 ) rather than d post (tari¤ 1988 tari¤ 1998 ). The second measure is a binary indicator taking the value one if an industry is among the 50% of industries with the highest tari¤ cuts, i.e. 1(jdt it j > dt 50% ). This measure is thus similar to the one used in the graphic analysis from the last section. Table 4 show the corresponding results which yield a qualitatively similar picture to the baseline estimates. Again, the strongest and most signi…cant e¤ect of CUSFTA is on domestic Canadian M&A activity. The impact on U.S.-by-U.S. acquisitions is marginally signi…cant for the binary indicator but magnitudes are again much smaller. Estimates for the cross-border acquisitions remain insigni…cant as before.
Results for Di¤erent Subsamples I perform further robustness checks by looking at speci…c subsamples of M&A transactions (see table 5 ). I start by excluding the acquirer SIC-code 6799 ("Investors, n.e.c."). As discussed earlier, a large fraction of this category is made up by private equity and venture capital …rms as well as private investors, groups which do not neatly …t into the earlier theoretical framework. Next, I include acquisitions of minority interests in my sample, i.e. transactions at the end of which the acquirer holds less than 50% of control rights or held more than 50% to begin with. Block 3 of table 5 only uses M&A transactions taking place within identical three-digit manufacturing industries. A comparison with results for the full sample will shed some light on the relative importance of cross-vs. within-industry acquisitions discussed in section 2.
Finally, the last block of table 5 restricts the sample to transactions involving publicly traded …rms. This is of interest since the following sections, which look at target and acquirer characteristics and the quantitative importance of M&As as a form of reallocation, will almost exclusively rely on data for publicly traded …rms. It is thus useful to check whether the qualitative results found so far also apply to this particular subsample of …rms. In addition, publicly traded …rms tend to be bigger and are more likely to be exporters which suggests that CUSFTA's impact may indeed have been di¤erent for this group.
As is evident from table 5, the main conclusions from the previous sections are una¤ected by changes in sample composition. The impact of tari¤ cuts on domestic Canadian M&A activity is always positive and statistically signi…cant and the coe¢ cient magnitudes remain close to the baseline speci…cation. If anything, the impact seems to be larger for publicly traded …rms (a 15% increase in M&A activity per percentage point tari¤ cut compared to 11% above). Estimates for the other speci…cations remain insigni…cant although the point estimates for Canadian acquisitions in the U.S. are quite large for within-industry acquisitions and the subsample of publicly traded …rms.
Comparison with Post-Adjustment Period An alternative control group to EU transactions is post-1998 M&A activity in North America itself. The theoretical background discussed in section 3 suggests that the increase in M&As after CUSFTA should be a one-o¤ phenomenon. That is, once rati…cation by the Canadian parliament was certain, the full schedule of tari¤ reductions was known. One might thus expect a relatively fast reallocation of assets from import-competing …rms to exporters and a subsequent decline in liberalization-related M&A activity. To investigate this issue, I divide my post-liberalization period into two subperiods, 1989-1993 and 1994-1998, and also add a "post-adjustment" period with M&A transactions in 1999-2003. I then estimate the impact of post-1989 tari¤ cuts separately for each period. The corresponding speci…cation is:
where d i are industry …xed e¤ects as before and d t are period-speci…c intercepts.
As the results in table 6 indicate, the impact of CUSFTA on domestic Canadian M&A activity was indeed strongest in the period 1989-1993. After that coe¢ cient estimates come down and become insigni…cant for 1999-2003. Note, however, that the point estimates remain relatively large and statistically signi…cant for the 1994-1998 period. One potential explanation for this stretched-out response is that M&A activity involves substantial adjustment costs for the acquirer, combined with the fact that over 50% of acquirers make more than one acquisition in 1985-2003.
Secondly, in most sectors tari¤ cuts took place over the entire period 1989-1998. Since both exporting opportunities and import competition only increased after tari¤s had actually been cut, M&A incentives might not have been strong enough before that reduction (this will hold true if discount rates for future pro…ts are su¢ ciently high). Finally, the beginning of the 1999-2003 period coincided with a major stock market boom and an M&A wave in technology stocks (the "dot-com bubble") which might contaminate the estimates for this period. 19 Turning to the remaining categories, results are again insigni…cant for all periods although the point estimates for Canadian-U.S. acquisitions are again large. Interestingly, however, the largest impact is in the period 1999-2003 while point estimates for 1989-1993 are close to zero. Since such a late impact of CUSFTA seems unlikely, this is further evidence that the liberalization agreement did not have a major impact on cross-border M&A transactions.
Transaction Value Regressions I now present additional results using total transaction values rather than counts. As mentioned in section 4, the use of value data su¤ers from substantial problems with outliers and missing values. On the other hand, count data might unduly give too much weight too smaller transactions so that looking at results for value data will still be instructive.
I start by re-estimating my baseline equation (1) but replace counts with the aggregate value of transactions in a given industry and period (pre-and post-CUSFTA):
Despite the use of value data rather than counts, Poisson is still the preferred estimation method (Wooldridge, 2002 , and Santos- Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) . This is since consistent estimation only requires the conditional mean to be correctly speci…ed and does not rely on v it actually following a Poisson distribution.
Columns 1-4 of table 7 present results for the "raw" value data, i.e. without deletion of outliers nor imputation of any of the 55% of missing transaction values. For the cross-border categories, point estimates and signi…cance levels are quite similar to the baseline speci…cation. The coe¢ cient estimate for domestic Canadian M&As is about 50% higher than before but this seems to be due to the overrepresentation of publicly traded companies in this sample. 20 The one signi…cant di¤erence to the baseline count speci…cation is found for domestic U.S. M&A activity where the point estimate drops to -17.3 and is now highly statistically signi…cant. However, this change can be traced to the presence of only three to four massive outliers, representing less than 0.02% of all U.S. transactions.
Once these deals are dropped (in particular the $20 billion acquisition of RJR Nabisco by Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts in 1988), the coe¢ cient estimate again becomes insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero.
To control more generally for the presence of outliers, columns 5-8 exclude all transactions with values bigger than 75 times the median value in a given industry. Furthermore, I impute missing transaction values at the industry mean to alleviate problems arising from missing data. 21 As seen, this brings results much closer in line with the original baseline speci…cation, in particular for 2 0 This group of companies is overrepresented since data availability for transaction values is roughly twice as good for this group as for private companies and subsidiaries (the other two principal groups in the data). Indeed, the point estimate in column 1 (18.8) is not far from the estimate for the subsample of publicly traded …rms (15.5, see table 5). 2 1 The 75 median rule drops around 0.5% of all transactions. This particular threshold was chosen since results are broadly stable to the exclusion of further outliers beyond this point. Imputing values at the median rather than the mean also does not change any of the …ndings. show any support for this possibility. 22 Third, if a looser competition policy was responsible for the surge in Canadian M&A activity one would expect to see a far stronger e¤ect for within-industry transactions which is not the case. 23 Finally, even if a policy change had been responsible for increases in M&A activity, this is not neccessarily incompatible with M&As as a means of resource transfer: the need for industrial restructuring after CUSFTA could have been the underlying cause for increased M&A activity and a more lenient stance from the competition authorities may have merely facilitated the adjustment.
Comparison of Acquirers and Targets
The last sections have provided evidence that CUSFTA led to an increase in M&A activity, in particular in Canada and both within and between industries. This section looks in more detail at the characteristics of acquirers and targets in order to determine whether the resulting inter…rm transfer of resources is similar in nature to the one involved in …rm and establishment exit and contraction. The existing literature has shown that it is usually the less productive …rms and plants that contract or exit. While it is typically not possible to track the employment of factors of production in these studies, the parallel expansion of high productivity establishments seems to indicate that they re-employ at least part of the freed-up resources. The question thus arises whether M&As similarly lead to a channeling of resources towards more productive owners. This also has important implications for M&A-induced changes in aggregate productivity since existing studies have demonstrated that post-takeover gains in the target's productivity depend crucially on a superior e¢ ciency of the acquiring …rm (e.g. Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001) .
A simple way of comparing targets and acquirers is to regress proxies for …rm size and performance on dummies for whether a company is a target or an acquirer in a transaction. For this, I use data from Compustat North America and Compustat Global as described in section 4. I start by looking at net sales to get an impression of the size di¤erence between targets and acquirers.
Next, I analyse performance di¤erences by looking at levels of pro…tability, returns to shareholders and total factor productivity. 24 The basic econometric speci…cation I estimate is:
where y tj is the size or performance indicator of interest for company j at time t (where t denotes the last completed …scal year prior to the takeover announcement). The d t represent time …xed e¤ects and target tj is a dummy that takes the value one if the company in question is a target. 25 The coe¢ cient of interest is thus 1 which gives the mean di¤erence between targets and acquirers (which are the omitted category).
Block 1 of table 8 shows results for these baseline regressions. Acquirers are found to be signi…cantly bigger in terms of net sales (column 1). In addition, they show signi…cantly lower levels of pretax pro…ts and returns to shareholders (columns 3 and 4). Interestingly, using estimates of , d t and 1 for these speci…cations, one …nds for most years of the sample that targets were on average making losses prior to takeover. Finally, acquirers are estimated to be 4.8% more productive than targets, with this di¤erence again being sign…cant at the 1% level.
My baseline estimate of 1 is an average across all four M&A categories, i.e. U.S. and Canadian domestic transactions and the two cross-border categories. Next, I allow for acquirer-target di¤er-ences to vary across these groups by estimating separate intercepts and slopes for all four types of M&A transactions:
where CAT are the category speci…c intercepts and tarU U tj , tarCC tj , tarU C tj , and tarCU tj are binary variables indicating whether a company is a target in one of the four types of transactions (for example, tarU C tj equals one if company j is the U.S. target of a Canadian acquirer).
Results on the four target dummy coe¢ cients are shown in block 2 of table 8. Target-acquirer di¤erences for net sales and pretax income are broadly similar across all categories. Returns to shareholders are always lower for acquisition targets as before, although the di¤erence is much smaller and not signi…cant for Canada-by-U.S. acquisitions. Most interestingly, however, are the di¤erences revealed by the productivity estimates. First, di¤erences in total factor productivity seem to be considerably more pronounced for domestic Canadian and Canada-by-U.S. acquisitions (acquirers are 14% and 37% more productive, respectively). For domestic U.S. transactions, the productivity advantage of acquirers is somewhat lower (5%) but still highly signi…cant. In contrast, the productivity di¤erence for U.S.-by-Canada acquisitions is actually signi…cantly positive. One potential explanation might be that there are gains for Canadian …rms that go beyond a pure reallocation story where acquirers improve the target …rm's productivity (e.g. access to superior technology in the U.S. market). For all other categories, however, it seems that resources are transferred from less to more pro…table and productive …rms.
In a last step, I augment speci…cation (4) of all exits (see table 9 ). That is, M&As seem to be by far the most important exit form for publicly traded …rms in North America. 26 Table 10 delves deeper by quantifying the average annual amount of jobs and production (net sales) transferred through the two exit forms. In addition, I also look at the third form of moving resources away from contracting …rms, i.e. decreases in employment and sales at continuing com- 2 6 An alternative to the approach taken here would be to use the Compustat sample to estimate the impact of trade on the three adjustment channels, e.g. using a multinomial probit model. However, this would only give an estimate of the impact of trade liberalization on the relative incidence of the channels rather than the magnitude of the resource transfer involved. More importantly, there are some important limitations of the Compustat sample which prevent such a more detailed analysis. Most importantly, the focus on publicly traded …rms means the number of Canadian …rms is too small for the level of disaggregation used here (I have 140 sectors but only have exit information on 347 …rms in Canada). In addition, I have no information on acquirers so that I cannot perform splits into the impact of CUSFTA on cross-border and domestic activity which was found to be very di¤erent. Finally, there are some issues related to the timing of exit and M&A's since the date of deletion from Compustat need not correspond exactly to the actual transaction date.
panies. The resulting …gures show that while reductions at existing …rms are the most important channel, M&As are responsible for about 30% of job-and sales volume redeployment. These …gures are similar for both the U.S. and Canada and demonstrate that M&As are indeed a quantitatively important way of transferring resources between …rms. For the publicly traded companies analyzed here, it also far outweighs exit via bankruptcy as the third adjustment channel. 27 It is likely that exit by bankruptcy will be more important among smaller, non-publicly traded companies and that turnover at continuing …rms will also be higher for this group (see Davis et al., 1996) .
On the other hand, it has already been pointed out that publicly traded …rms account for over 80% of manufacturing output and employment in North America. Thus, the overall quantitative importance of M&As is unlikely to decrease by much in a more comprehensive sample. Combined with the earlier …ndings that CUSFTA led to large increases in domestic M&A activity in Canada (over 70% according to my estimates), these results suggest that the amount of resource transfer involved was indeed substantial. proceed as follows. For companies present in two adjacent periods t and t+1, I compute reductions in sales and employment at individual …rms (set to zero for expanding …rms), aggregate these for every year in the sample and then take the yearly average. Firms present in t but not in t+1 are classi…ed as "exit by M&A" or "exit by bankruptcy" according to the information provided in
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Compustat. The total resource transfers via M&A in a given year t+1 are then simply the sum of employment and sales in period t across all …rms exiting via M&A between the two periods (likewise for exit via bankruptcy). (1) and (5) show the total number of M&A transactions involving manufacturing targets in the U.S. and Canada with acquirers having their principal activity in the SIC-code listed on the left. Columns (2) and (6) express these numbers as % of the total number of manufacturing M&A transaction in the respective country. Columns (3) and (7) list the fraction of acquirers from a given SIC code that have a primary OR secondary three-digit SIC-code in manufacturing. Columns (4) and (8) similarly list the fraction of acquirers that have at least one three-digit manufacturing SIC-code (primary or secondary) in common with the target. . The excluded category is the pre-CUSFTA period dummy dpre. +, * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively. Notes: Table shows results for OLS regressions (robust t-values in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry level). The dependent variables are the company characteristics listed across the top of columns 1-4. "Return to shareholders" is calculated as share price (t) + dividends (t) divided by the share price in t-1 (expressed in percentage points). See appendix A.2 for details on data sources and construction. Regressors in specification (1) include a constant and a dummy for whether a company is a target. Specifications (2) and (3) include separate intercepts and target dummy terms for all four M&A categories (see text for full specification). The table shows coefficient estimates for the four target dummies: "Target CAN by CAN" (targets in takeovers of Canadian firms by other Canadian firms), "Target U.S. by U.S." (targets in takeovers of U.S. firms by other U.S. firms), "Target U.S. by CAN" (targets in takeovers of U.S. firms by Canadian firms), and "Target CAN by U.S." (targets in takeovers of Canadian firms by U.S. firms). Also included are year fixed effects (all specifications) and 3-digit industry fixed effects (specification 3 only). +, * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively. 
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